Election Timing and Public Policy by Gersen, Jacob E.
 
Election Timing and Public Policy
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Jacob Gersen, Election Timing and Public Policy, 6 Q.J. Pol.
Science 103 (2011).
Published Version http://nowpublishers.com/media/Journal-Article-
PDFs/100.00010070.pdf
Accessed February 19, 2015 1:12:03 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10913978
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAPQuarterly Journal of Political Science, 2011, 6: 103–135
Election Timing and Public Policy∗
Christopher R. Berry1 and Jacob E. Gersen2
1Associate Professor of Public Policy, University of Chicago, USA;
crberry@uchicago.edu
2Professor of Law, Harvard University, USA; jgersen@law.harvard.edu
ABSTRACT
There are nearly half a million elected officials in American local govern-
ments,andthetimingoflocalelectionsvariesenormouslyevenwithinthe
same state. Some local elections are held simultaneously with major fed-
eral and state races, while others are held at times when no higher level
elections coincide. We analyze the effect of election timing by exploit-
ing a 1980s change in the California Election Code, which allowed school
districts to change their elections from off-cycle to on-cycle. Because we
are able to observe very large within-district changes in voter turnout
resulting from changes in election timing, we are able to isolate the effect
of turnout on policy outcomes, including teacher salaries and student
achievement tests. Our analysis demonstrates that while election timing
produces dramatic changes in voter turnout, resulting changes in public
policy are modest in size and not robust statistically.
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Elections are perhaps the most-studied institution of modern democra-
cies. With illuminating and often excruciating detail, political scientists
and lawyers have long analyzed how electoral rules and processes influence
the performance of political institutions. Yet, with a few notable excep-
tions, there is a comparative paucity of scholarship focusing on the timing
of elections. Were electoral timing either conceptually unrelated to demo-
cratic legitimacy or empirically inconsequential perhaps this relative dearth
of attention would be understandable, but electoral timing is neither. Like
other institutional conditions that affect the costs of political participation,
when elections are held can affect the level and nature of group participation
in the political arena and thereby also affect policy outcomes.
Election timing in parliamentary systems has spawned some interest
(Smith, 2003, 2004), but less so in the United States, where the timing of
elections for federal office is tightly regulated and exhibits only modest vari-
ation across political jurisdictions. Both scholars and politicians have long
understood that electoral behavior in oﬀ-years — years without Presidential
elections — differs from participation during years with Presidential elec-
tions, but this has sensibly been the starting and stopping point for thinking
about electoral timing in the U.S. federal context.
Given that there are more than 500,000 elected officials in the United
States and fewer than 600 of them are federal officials, state and local elec-
toral settings provide richer fodder for empirical analysis (Berry and Gersen,
2009). Among local governments, moreover, there is enormous heterogeneity
with respect to when elections are held. Some localities hold all elections
on the same day in November; other local political jurisdictions hold elec-
tions for different offices on entirely separate days during different times of
the year. In some localities there is at least one local government election
in 11 months of the year (Souzzi, 2007). Amidst this great heterogeneity,
one widely known and well accepted fact is that turnout in local elections
is notably higher when those elections are held concurrently with major
national or state races (Hajnal et al., 2002).
Equally important, the legal regimes that govern the timing of local elec-
tions vary significantly across jurisdictions (Berry and Gersen, 2009). State
statutes sometimes set the actual date for all local government elections.
Elsewhere, the timing of elections is left partially or entirely to the very
government bodies subject to the elections. If electoral timing predictably
affects participation differently across groups, then elected officials couldElection Timing and Public Policy 105
conceivably use electoral timing to manipulate voter participation and ulti-
mately substantive public policy downstream (Dunne et al., 1997).
Most of the small literature on turnout and election timing is based on
cross-sectional comparisons of jurisdictions with different election schedules.
Our research design is a within-jurisdiction analysis that takes advantage of
a 1980s change in the California Election Code that allowed school boards
to change their elections from odd years (off-cycle) to even years (on-cycle).
This simple change in scheduling produced more than a 150 percent
increase in voter turnout in school board elections. These dramatic changes
in turnout in similar elections over time do not stem from differences in
the underlying substance of the elections themselves. We observe elections
within the same political jurisdiction under conditions of high and low voter
turnout and test for resulting changes in policy outcomes. Specifically, we
analyze a conventional measure of interest group influence, teacher salaries,
as well as a conventional measure of aggregate performance, student test
scores.
Our analysis demonstrates that dramatic changes in voter turnout for
school board elections produce small, and often statistically insignificant,
effects on substantive education policies. Indeed, our preferred specification
shows zero effects. We cannot say whether this null result arises because
voters in an election with low turnout have preferences similar to those of
voters in the high turnout case, but we can say that the effect of dramatically
increased voter turnout on policy is modest, at best. Thus, using a new and
different empirical approach that focuses on policy outcomes directly, our
results are consistent with an accumulation of past studies suggesting that
substantial increases in voter participation would not substantially alter the
outcomes of the democratic process (e.g., Highton and Wolfinger, 1999).
Election Timing, Selective Participation, and Public Policy
We work from a simple model of voter behavior. We assume that whenever an
election is held, there will be some citizens who are indifferent between voting
and not voting. For this group of citizens, the benefits of voting are roughly
equal to the costs of political participation. As participation costs increase,
these voters will stop participating and as a result, the median voter in the
group of actual voters will change. Similarly, as participation costs decrease,106 Berry and Gersen
some citizens who were unwilling to bear the costs of voting previously may
choose to participate, again changing the identity of the median actual voter
in the election. That is, the observed or actual median voter is endogenous to
the political participation cost structure (Dunne et al., 1997). As participa-
tion costs rise, the voters who continue to participate in elections should be
those with the most at stake in the outcome. Here, and elsewhere, we refer to
this as selective participation (Berry and Gersen, 2010; Berry, 2009): the pool
of actual voters in a given election is a selective function of voter interest —
potentialgainsorlossesfromtheelectoraloutcome.Becauserising(declining)
costsofparticipationdriveout(attract)potentialvotersfromanelectionselec-
tively, the substantive political preferences of actual voters may diverge from
the political preferences of nonvoters in the jurisdiction.
To illustrate, consider two elections for school board membership. The first
takes place in April and is the only election on that day. The second takes
place in November on the same day and at the same location as elections for
other local, state, and national offices. The selective participation framework
suggests that the preferences of the voters in the oddly timed school board
election will not only be different from those of voters in the November school
board election (cf. Rubinfeld and Thomas, 1980; Rubinfeld, 1977; Berry and
Gersen, 2010), but also that the differences between actual voters and the
pool of potential voters in the jurisdiction will be larger for the oddly timed
election than the November election. Indeed, a couple of excellent papers
have already explored these ideas in the context of school bond elections
(Dunne et al., 1997; Meredith, 2009), showing that bonds are more likely
to pass during elections held off-cycle, due to the differing, more supportive
electorate that goes to the polls.
In the case of school board elections, it is widely acknowledged that
teachers unions are the single most influential interest group (Hess, 2002).
Moreover, Moe (2006) has shown that teachers are two- to seven-times more
likely to vote in school board elections than other citizens. The selective
participation framework suggests that special interest voters — for exam-
ple, union members — will be more influential in off-cycle than on-cycle
elections.
A standard measure of the political influence of public sector unions is the
salary of public employees.1 Therefore, the first policy outcome we analyze is
1 We follow a signiﬁcant literature in using public employee’s salaries as a dependent variable
in an analysis of political inﬂuence. The related literature is vast, but important contributionsElection Timing and Public Policy 107
teacher salaries. Specifically, we ask whether the salary schedules negotiated
between school boards and union representatives are more favorable when
districts operate on low-turnout, off-cycle election schedules.2
Importantly, the selective participation argument is not a normative one.
When participation is most costly only the voters who care most intensely
about the issue at stake will turn out. On the one hand, special interests may
use their electoral influence to secure particularistic benefits for themselves
at the expense of nonvoters. On the other hand, special interests are likely to
be precisely those voters with the most information and the greatest exper-
tise regarding the issue at stake, and their participation may result in better
candidates being elected (or worse candidates being voted out), ultimately
leading to better public policy. Which of these two effects dominates in any
given case is an empirical question.3 Thus, in addition to teacher salaries, we
also analyze student test scores. If off-cycle elections encourage participation
by a more informed electorate, schools may ultimately perform better. If so,
then we should expect to see student test scores decline following a change
to on-cycle elections.
Before turning to the data, however, we note at least three good reasons to
expect that these hypothesized effects might not, in fact, materialize. First,
the selective participation thesis may simply be wrong. If the decision to
vote is motivated by some factor that is unrelated to policy preferences —
say, the sense of duty to vote — then voters may be a fairly representative
sample of the electorate regardless of the timing of the election (Ellcessor and
Leighley, 2001; Highton and Wolfinger, 2001; Verba et al., 1995). Second, in
the context of local government specifically, some versions of the Tiebout
include Babcock and Enberg (1999), Baugh and Stone (1982), Bellante and Long (1981),
Courant et al. (1979), Ehrenberg and Goldstein (1975), Farber (1986), Fogel and Lewin (1973),
Freeman (1986), Freund (1973), Kleiner and Petree (1988), O’Brien (1992, 1994), Summers
(1973), and Rose and Sonstelie (2006). Reviews of the literature, though now somewhat dated,
are provided by Aaron et al. (1988), Gregory and Borland (1999), and Stone (2002).
2 Trounstine (2010) ﬁnds that municipal employees in cities with oﬀ-cycle elections earn more
than those in cities with on-cycle elections, and Anzia (forthcoming) reports similar ﬁndings
for teachers, although both analyses are strictly cross-sectional.
3 This basic tradeoﬀ — namely that delegating to those with expertise may generate better
decisions but also gives the expert some latitude to exploit the principal — is a very general
problem and a core element of literature on mechanism design (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). The
rationale for delegating authority to committees in Congress exhibits similar concerns (Shepsle
and Weingast, 1994). Delegating some policymaking authority to specialized committees may
be an eﬃcient way for the chamber to generate informed policies, but committees may also use
their informational advantages strategically to beneﬁt their members rather than the chamber
(Krehbiel, 1991; Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987).108 Berry and Gersen
model suggest that policy is shaped by interjurisdictional competition more
than by electoral politics (Perroni and Scharf, 2001; Sprunger and Wilson,
1998; Rausher, 1998; Rose-Ackerman, 1983; Sonstelie and Portney, 1978).
Although this view is itself sometimes contested (e.g., Epple and Zelenitz,
1981), a common theme in the local political economy literature is that
‘‘voting with your feet’’ makes voting at the ballot box superfluous.4 Third,
voter turnout is itself partly a function of government policy, and if elected
officials stray too far from general public sentiment, these deviations could
induce erstwhile nonvoters to come to the polls in response. In other words,
the threat of increased voter participation puts a limit on the extent to
which elected officials may cater to special interests even in off-cycle elections
(Berry, 2009, Ch. 3). Ultimately, these too are empirical questions, and we
seek to shed light on them in the next section.
Empirical Analysis
We focus our analysis on local government elections in California for two
reasons. First, there is a rich archive of electoral data available from the
Center for California Studies at Sacramento State University. As explained
below, this archive enables us to analyze thousands of local elections span-
ning 1996 through 2008. In most other states, by contrast, election data
are maintained at the local level and must be collected on a cumbersome
county-by-county basis.5
The second and more important reason for analyzing California is that
there has been a large scale change in the timing of school board elections in
the state. Prior to 1986, school district elections were held in odd-numbered
years, while most other local and state government elections were held in
even-numbered years. In 1986, the California Assembly passed Assembly
Bill (AB) 2605, which authorized school districts to consolidate elections of
board members with primary or general elections held in the county in which
the district is located. The bill seems to have been overwhelmingly supported
and the legislative history reveals that virtually all of the political rhetoric
focused on the cost savings that would accrue from election consolidation
and on the possibility of increasing voter turnout — generally described as
4 For an extended discussion of these ideas, see Berry (2009, Chap. 7).
5 An exception is South Carolina, which “is the only state that centrally collects precinct-level
election data for local school board races” (Berry and Howell, 2007).Election Timing and Public Policy 109
an unqualified democratic good.6 Because of a then-recent change allowing
other special government districts to shift the date of their elections, had the
bill failed, school districts would have been the only special district legally
required to hold elections in odd years. As a result, at least one member of
the legislature was concerned that school boards would be forced to pay all
of what had been shared election costs.7 The modest debates in the press
mirror these same concerns (e.g., Maeshiro, 2005). The little opposition to
the bill that did emerge was generally focused on a provision of the law
that required approval from the board of supervisors of the county in which
the school board changing election dates was located. Some administrators
thought the decision should be left to the school boards alone.
Following the passage of AB 2605, California experienced a widespread
shift in the timing of school district elections. Whereas all school board
elections were held in odd years prior to the change in the law in 1986,
our estimates indicate that roughly two-thirds of the state’s districts had
changed their election dates to even years by 2008.
A major distinguishing feature of our analysis is that we are able to observe
electoral and policy outcomes within a jurisdiction over time before and
after a change in election timing that results in massive increases in turnout.
The advantages of this diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach are significant
when compared to a traditional cross-sectional analysis. A cross-sectional
analysis of election timing compares outcomes from one set of jurisdictions
holding even-year elections to outcomes from a different set of jurisdictions
holding odd-year elections (e.g., Trounstine, 2010; Anzia, forthcoming). The
6 The Republican Analysis of AB 2605, California State Assembly, Assembly Elections and Reap-
portionment Committee (Aug. 22, 1986), explains that consolidated elections will increase voter
turnout and thereby reduce the power of special interests like teachers’ unions. The Senate
Rules Committee (July 3, 1986) noted that the bill would lead to cost savings by allowing for
the consolidation of elections. Some supporters thought the bill would “would provide a broader
base of support for the public school system” (Letter from Jeﬀrey N. Hamilton, Superintendent,
Fort Jones Union Elementary School District, to Johan Klehs, Chairperson, Assembly Elec-
tions and Reapportionment Committee (Apr 4, 1986). Others emphasized cost savings (Letter
from Bob L. Blacett, District Superintendent, Modoc Joint Uniﬁed School District, to Johan
Klehs, Chairperson, Assembly Elections and Reapportionment Committee (Apr 2, 1986); Let-
ter from James M. Donnelly, Director, Governmental Relations, to Johan Klehs, Chairperson,
Assembly Elections and Reapportionment Committee (Feb 27, 1986). These letters are part of
the legislative history of the bill and on ﬁle with the authors.
7 Assemblyman Richard Robinson noted that “without enactment of AB 2605, school districts
could ...beleft to pay the full costs for conducting the expensive, low-turnout elections in the
oﬀ years” Letter from Richard Robinson, Assemblyman, 72d District, to George Deukmajian,
Governor, State of California (Aug. 21, 1986).110 Berry and Gersen
differences between the two types of jurisdictions may be attributable to the
effect of election timing, but the differences may also be due to other factors
that differ systematically between jurisdictions holding even- versus odd-
year elections. For example, California school districts that hold elections in
even years are smaller and less urban than districts that hold elections in odd
years (see Table 1). While it is, of course, possible to control for measurable
Table 1. Comparison of even- and odd-year districts.
Mean Standard deviation T-stat (p-value)
Step-10 teacher salary
Odd $ 63,056 $ 444 3.24
Even $ 61,180 $ 370 (0.0012)
Population density (county)
Odd 721 51 2.38
Even 564 42 (0.018)
Avg. wage per job (county)
Odd $ 36,056 $ 523 −0.38
Even $ 36,328 $ 499 (0.707)
Pct. Pop 65 and over
Odd 0.12 0.002 −0.428
Even 0.12 0.002 (0.66)
Pct. owner occupied housing
Odd 0.65 0.01 0.07
Even 0.65 0.01 (0.94)
Pct. Families with children
Odd 0.53 0.005 1.21
Even 0.52 0.004 (0.225)
Pct. free/reduced lunch eligible
Odd 0.38 0.01 0.78
Even 0.36 0.01 (0.435)
Total students
Odd 5,975 449 1.88
Even 4,752 470 (0.06)
Source: 2000 US Census for all variables except free/reduced lunch and total students,
which come from NCES, and average county wage, which comes from the BEA.Election Timing and Public Policy 111
district attributes in a statistical analysis, it is not possible to control for the
unobservable aspects of the districts that are also correlated with election
timing and voter participation (for example political interest or social capi-
tal). The policy change in California allows us to examine outcomes within
the same district before and after a change in election timing. As long as
other attributes of the district do not change before and after the shift in
election timing, we can be more confident that the observed differences in
outcomes are the result of the electoral regime.
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First we examine the effect of election
timing — specifically, the concurrence of major state and federal elections —
on turnout in school board elections. Next, we investigate the effect of elec-
tion timing on two related policy outcomes: teacher salaries and student test
scores.
Timing and Turnout
That turnout in local elections is higher when they coincide with major
national and state races is hardly a controversial proposition. For example,
Hajnal et al. (2002) found that turnout in California municipal elections
roughly doubles (from about 18 to 35 percent of adult residents) when those
elections coincide with a presidential or gubernatorial election. Based on
a national survey, Hess (2002) finds that turnout among registered vot-
ers in school board elections averages about 44 percent when those elec-
tions are concurrent with higher level offices, but only 26 percent when
they are held separately. Like most of the literature, these two studies rely
on cross-sectional data. A noteworthy exception is Townley et al. (1994),
who analyze changes in turnout within school districts in Riverside County,
California, after many of those districts changed their election time from
odd to even years. Their results are broadly consistent with the cross-section
literature. They find that districts that changed their election timing expe-
rienced between a doubling and tripling of turnout in subsequent elections.
Our empirical analysis in this section essentially generalizes the latter study
to include the entire state and extends the time frame with an additional
decade’s worth of election data.
We collected data on voter turnout from the California Elections Data
Archive (CEDA) maintained by the Center for California Studies at Sacra-
mento State University. The archive contains data on candidates, ballot
designations, and vote totals for all county, municipal, school district, and
community college elections held between 1996 and 2006. In total, we112 Berry and Gersen
obtained data on over 4,900 school district elections held during this time
period. CEDA contains the number of votes cast for each candidate in each
election. Based on this information, we computed voter turnout as the total
number of votes cast in the election divided by the voting age population in
the jurisdiction.8 Because 94 percent of school district elections took place in
November, we excluded other months from our analysis. Roughly two-thirds
of school district elections were held in even years. As shown in Table 2, elec-
tions held in odd years garnered less than half the level of voter participation
Table 2. Summary of school board election turnout.
Median Number of
Year turnout (%) elections
1996 38 577
1997 15 332
1998 31 566
1999 12 326
2000 36 519
2001 14 334
2002 26 594
2003 10 312
2004 37 545
All even years 33 2801
All odd years 13 1304
All years 22 4105
Note: Results for November elections.
8 We did not have access to data on the number of registered voters in the jurisdictions, so
we rely on the number of voting-age residents. In addition, we had to drop observations from
districts in which elections were held by ward rather than at large because we did not have
census data by school district election area from which to compute the voting age population.
As a result, we lose about 10 percent of districts, some of which are among the largest in
the state (e.g., Los Angeles and San Francisco Uniﬁed). For consistency, we also exclude these
districts form the second stage (i.e., salary and test score) analyses. However, our results do not
change notably if we include these districts in the second stage. Complete results are available
on request.Election Timing and Public Policy 113
as those held in even years — 13% versus 33% on average — and this dif-
ferential was evident throughout all the years studied.
In order to confirm that the average turnout differentials are not result
of differences in other attributes of the jurisdictions that hold their elec-
tions at different times, we ran a series of regression models controlling for
population characteristics thought to influence voter turnout.9 Specifically,
we control for population size, as well as the racial and age composition
of the jurisdiction. In addition, we control for the homeownership rate and
the fraction of families with children, which are expected to be especially
important determinants of participation in local elections. We emphasize
that these variables measure the aggregate attributes of the population in
the jurisdictions, not the attributes of individual voters, and therefore the
usual cautions regarding the ecological fallacy apply (e.g., King, 1997).
Table 3 shows the results of the turnout analysis. Models (1) and (2) show
the regression of turnout on election timing and jurisdictional demograph-
ics. The coefficient for the odd-year dummy variable in model (1) is highly
significant statistically and, at negative 20 percentage points, nearly equal
to the simple difference in means. In other words, controlling for popula-
tion demographics does not alter the basic story about turnout differentials
between even and odd years.
Of course, we do not suggest that the evenness of the election year, per se,
causes differences in voter participation. Rather, we hypothesize that the
concurrence of major state and federal races in even years draws voters to
the polls who otherwise might not vote in local elections. This hypothesis
is tested more directly in model (2), which substitutes dummy variables
for presidential, gubernatorial, and senatorial election years in place of the
catchall odd-year dummy variable.10 The results indicate that turnout in
school district elections is roughly 22 percentage points higher in presiden-
tial election years and 16 percentage points higher in gubernatorial election
years, relative to odd years. The marginal effect on turnout of holding a
9 We obtained data the 1990 and 2000 US Censuses and linearly projected values for other years.
10 California gubernatorial elections occur in even years alternating with presidential elections.
For example, there were presidential elections in 1996, 2000, and so on, while there were guber-
natorial elections in 1998, 2002, etc. We cannot separately identify the eﬀects of U.S. House
elections, because they always coincide with either a presidential or gubernatorial election.
We can, however, identify the marginal eﬀect of U.S. Senate elections due to their staggered
timing. For example, there was a senatorial election in 2000 and 2004, but not in 2002.114 Berry and Gersen
Table 3. Election timing and voter participation: school boards, 1996–2004.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
OLS OLS FE FE
Odd year election −0.204
∗∗∗ −0.222
∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.041)
Election day — President 0.219
∗∗∗ 0.231
∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.041)
Election day — Governor 0.160
∗∗∗ 0.174
∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.040)
Election day — US Senetor 0.015
∗ 0.024
∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.005)
Ln (total population) −0.101
∗∗∗ −0.100
∗∗∗ 0.095 0.087
(0.006) (0.006) (0.086) (0.084)
% Black/African American
population
0.235 0.230 −0.370 −0.397
(0.148) (0.147) (0.395) (0.390)
% American Indian/Alaska native
population
−0.640
∗∗∗ −0.649
∗∗∗ −1.135 −0.879
(0.129) (0.131) (1.636) (1.684)
% Asian, native Hawaiian and
other paciﬁc islander population
0.021 0.017 0.030 −0.051
(0.084) (0.084) (0.224) (0.222)
% Other race population −8.379 −8.658 1.091 0.989
(5.930) (5.892) (3.881) (3.897)
% Hispanic/Latino population −0.227
∗∗∗ −0.230
∗∗∗ −0.357
∗ −0.388
∗∗
(0.054) (0.054) (0.194) (0.193)
% Persons 65+ years old 1.542
∗∗∗ 1.513
∗∗∗ 0.508 0.609
(0.382) (0.383) (0.941) (0.916)
Ln (Ave. household income) 0.309
∗∗∗ 0.307
∗∗∗ −0.033 −0.044
(0.032) (0.033) (0.072) (0.072)
% Owner-occupied housing units −0.207 −0.205 0.091 0.053
(0.130) (0.130) (0.364) (0.362)
% Families and subfamilies with
own children
0.612
∗∗ 0.598
∗∗ 0.639
∗ 0.689
∗
(0.287) (0.287) (0.371) (0.356)
Constant −2.155
∗∗∗ −2.334
∗∗∗ −0.616 −0.628
(0.378) (0.382) (0.816) (0.824)
Number of observations 4,105 4,105 4,105 4,105
R2 0.363 0.368 0.046 0.085
Note: Standard errors clustered by district reported in parentheses.
∗∗∗p<0.01,
∗∗p<0.05,
∗p<0.1.Election Timing and Public Policy 115
U.S. Senate election coincident with a presidential or gubernatorial election
is negligible.11
Models (3) and (4) of Table 3 introduce school district fixed effects,
thereby isolating within-district differences in turnout between even and
odd years. Identification in the fixed effects models comes from two sources.
First, some districts held elections for school board seats in both even and
odd years, usually due to the need for a special election to fill a vacant seat.
Second, some districts changed their election timing from even to odd years
during the course of our study period, as explained above. In both cases, we
are able to observe how turnout differs within the same district between even
and odd years. This specification purges the results of any time-invariant
differences between districts that hold their elections on different schedules.
The results do not change significantly from the OLS models. The only
notable difference is that the senatorial election dummy becomes statistically
significant — though remaining substantively small — with the inclusion of
the district fixed effects.
The control variables in Table 3 perform generally as expected. The cross-
sectional results (models 1 and 2) indicate that turnout is lower in larger
districts, and in districts with a higher proportion of Hispanics, or Native
Americans. Turnout is higher in districts with more people over the age of
65, more families with children, and higher incomes. However, all but one
of these effects dissipates when district fixed effects are added in models (3)
and (4). The exception is the percent Hispanic variable, whose effect actu-
ally increases in the fixed effects specifications. Too see why, recall that the
dependent variable is defined as the number of votes over the voting age
population. However, because they are disproportionately likely to be nonci-
tizens, a simple count of the voting age population is particularly likely to
overstate the number of eligible voters where there are many Hispanics.
Policy Consequences: Employee Compensation
Employee compensation represents an obvious dependent variable for a test
interest group influence in school board politics (e.g., Baugh and Stone, 1982;
Dunne et al., 1996; Kleiner and Petree, 1988; Rose and Sonstelie, 2006).
11 We cannot deﬁnitively attribute the turnout diﬀerential in presidential or gubernatorial election
years to the presence of those oﬃces on the ballot. In principle, any oﬃce that follows the same
schedule of elections would produce the same coeﬃcient in the model. However, we think it
reasonable to attribute the turnout diﬀerentials to the top oﬃces on the ballot.116 Berry and Gersen
First, there is clear evidence of selective participation by teachers’ union
members in school district elections (Moe, 2006). Second, higher salaries
are a universal and unambiguous goal for teachers and their unions. Third,
teacher salaries follow a rigid pay scale based on qualifications and expe-
rience, and comprehensive data on the pay scales are available from the
California Department of Education (CDE). Thus, while teacher salaries
represent just one special interest policy objective, they are a particularly
direct, easily measurable, and unambiguous outcome for testing our theory.12
It is important to note that school districts do not have unfettered author-
ity to set fiscal policy. Most states place limits on districts’ fiscal autonomy,
and California is extreme in the extent to which local budgets are deter-
mined at the state level (Hoxby, 2001). As a result of voter-approved tax
limits and court-ordered and legislative school finance reforms, the state gov-
ernment effectively determines local budgets and guarantees each district a
roughly equal level of per pupil funding (Timar, 2006).13 Individual districts
have only limited ability to independently change the size of their bud-
gets.14 Nevertheless, within the top-line budget constraint, districts retain
nearly complete latitude in setting teacher salaries (Rose and Sengupta,
2007).15
Each district determines its own salary schedule — that is, the salary
paid to teachers with different combinations of education and experience —
usually through a process of collective bargaining with union representa-
tives. In other words, districts effectively decide how much of their budget
to allocate to teacher compensation versus other expenditures.16 In prac-
tice there is tremendous heterogeneity in teacher salaries among districts
within the state. For example, in 2005, the most generous district, Los
Gatos-Saratoga, paid $80,040, while the least generous district, Potter Val-
ley Unified, paid only $42,733 for equivalently qualified teachers at step 10
12 See footnote 3 above for additional references using public employee salaries as a measure of
union political inﬂuence.
13 Categorical programs that provide supplemental funds for speciﬁc purposes, such as educating
special-needs and low-income students or operating small schools, generate some variation in
local revenue, meaning that per pupil spending is not perfectly equalized across districts.
14 Schools may enhance their budgets by raising voluntary contributions, but Brunner and Son-
stelie (2003) show that such contributions account for a very small share of the variation in
funding across schools.
15 Beginning in the 1999–2000 school year, the state mandated a minimum teacher salary of
$32,000, but the requirement was not binding for most districts (Loeb and Miller, 2006).
16 On average in California, teacher compensation accounts for half of a district’s total per pupil
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in the salary schedule. Indeed, in every year of our study, the highest pay-
ing district offered a salary roughly twice as high as that of the lowest paying
district for comparably qualified teachers. Meanwhile, the 75th percentile
district paid on average about 20% more than the 25th percentile district
in each year. Thus, despite limits on districts’ fiscal independence, there is
substantial variation in teacher compensation across districts that remains
to be explained. In the concluding section of the paper, we return to these
issues and discuss the generalizability of our results beyond California.
We obtained the certificated salary and benefit schedule (form J-90) from
the CDE for each school district and each year from 1999 through 2008.17
To identify comparable teachers across districts, we focus on those at step 10
in the salary schedule (BA degree plus 60 hours of continuing education),
which is often taken to represent a typical teacher (e.g., Rose and Sengupta,
2007).18 This allows us to compare the salaries received by teachers with
the same qualifications and experience in even-year and odd-year election
districts.
Note that the policy reform that allowed school districts to change their
elections from odd to even years occurred in 1986, while the first year for
which district-level salary data are electronically available is 1999. Therefore,
we first observe the outcome of interest more than 10 years after the change
in election timing may have occurred. By this time, most of the districts
that were to change to even-year elections had already done so. In order to
enable a differences-in-differences analysis, we collected additional teacher
salary data for 1987, the last year before the policy change took effect.19
We collected the records from paper archives at the CDE and entered the
data manually. As a result, we are able to estimate each district’s change in
salary relative to its baseline, or pre-treatment level. We estimate whether
districts that switched to even year elections exhibited differential changes
in salary relative to districts remaining on an odd-year election schedule.
This approach effectively controls for (observable and unobservable) time-
invariant attributes of districts that may differ between those that changed
17 1999 is the earliest year of data available. The data are obtained by CDE from local school
districts through a survey. Although participation in the survey is voluntary, the response rate
is 84 percent of districts representing 98 percent of the state’s students. The responses are
checked by CDE and reconﬁrmed with the districts before publication (CDE, 2006, p. 1).
18 Focusing on the starting salary, the highest salary, or the average salary yields comparable
results to those presented below.
19 The state law was changed in 1986; the ﬁrst year in which an even-year election could have
been held was 1988. Therefore, 1987 is the last “pre-treatment” year.118 Berry and Gersen
election timing and those that did not. More formally, we estimate:
ln(salaryi)=α + δ ln(S1987i)+ψXi + εi,
where salaryi denotes the average step-10 salary for district i over the period
1999 to 2008 and S1987i represents the salary in district i the year before
AB2605 took effect, which we also refer to as the district’s baseline salary.
Xi is a vector of district-level covariates that could influence teacher salaries,
explained below. The vector ψ contains regression coefficients, α is the inter-
cept, and εi is an error term.
We include the following variables in Xi.20 The average wage in the local
labor market provides a rough index of regional differentials that districts
must offer to be competitive in attracting teachers. We use the annual aver-
age wage in the county as estimated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.21
We control for the size of the district, using the natural log of the number
of students, to account for the possibility that unions are stronger in larger
districts and therefore would extract more generous compensation indepen-
dently from the timing of elections (Rose and Sonstelie, 2006). We control
for population density to capture potential differences between more or less
urban districts. In addition, we control for the fraction of students receiving
free or reduced price lunch, according to the National Center for Education
Statistics, because districts with more low-income students may be perceived
as more challenging by teachers, requiring additional compensation (Rose
and Sengupta, 2007). We control for demographic factors that may influ-
ence the attentiveness of local voters to school board politics, namely: the
fraction of the population that is over 65, the fraction of housing units that
are owner-occupied, and the fraction of families with school-age children.
These three variables are taken from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses and val-
ues are linearly interpolated for other years. Because costs may vary for
different types of districts, we include dummy variables for elementary and
high school districts. Unified districts (K-12), which enroll about 70% of
pupils, are the omitted category. These control variables, like the dependent
variable, are measured as averages across the post-treatment years.
20 Our selection of control variables was inﬂuenced by Rose and Sonstelie (2006) and Rose and
Sengupta (2007).
21 In principle, we would prefer to use the average wage for a worker with education and experience
comparable to that of the average teacher, as in Rose and Sengupta (2007). However, the
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Table 4. Election timing and teacher salaries.
(1) (2) (3)
Even year election −0.039∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.010∗
(0.011) (0.007) (0.006)
Log 1987 step-10 salary 0.565∗∗∗
(0.051)
Log county avg. wage 0.162∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.019)
Log population per Sq Mi 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Pct Pop 65 or older 0.275∗ 0.191∗
(0.146) (0.106)
Pct Owner-occupied housing −0.025 −0.012
(0.039) (0.031)
Pct families with children 0.222∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.067)
Pct free-reduced lunch eligible −0.017 −0.015
(0.021) (0.017)
Log number of students 0.038∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Constant 11.031∗∗∗ 8.912∗∗∗ 3.583∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.257) (0.546)
Number of districts 541 531 531
R2 0.065 0.646 0.762
Note: The dependent variable is the log of average step-10 teacher salary, 1999–2008.
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
∗∗∗p<0.01,
∗∗p<0.05,
∗p<0.1
Model (1) of Table 4 reports the bivariate regression of teacher salary
against election timing. Teachers working in districts where elections are
held in even years earn roughly 4 percent less than those in districts with
odd year elections. With the addition of relevant covariates in model (2),
the election timing estimates drops by roughly half to 2.2 percent.
The estimates in models (1) and (2) rely on cross-sectional comparisons
between even- and odd-year election districts. As we suggested above, such120 Berry and Gersen
estimatesmaybeconfoundedbyunmeasureddifferencesbetweenthetwocat-
egories of districts. In model (3), we add the baseline (1987) teacher salary
as a control variable, allowing us to estimate the differences-in-differences in
salaries.Theestimatesinmodel(3)indicatethatsalariesinevenyeardistricts
increased1percentlessthansalariesinodd-yeardistricts,relativetotheir1987
baselinelevels,whichisonlyabouthalfaslargeasthecross-sectionalestimates
from model (2) and significant at only the 10 percent level.
While all of the estimated salary differences between even- and odd-year
election districts are statistically significant, they are nevertheless fairly
small substantively. With an average step 10 salary of $62,000 in 2008, the
even-year salary differential of 1 percent amounts to about $620. While this
amount may be substantial from the perspective of an individual teacher,
the mean difference between the 75th and 25th percentile district salaries is
more than 20 times as much. Moreover, that the within-district estimates
are about 50 percent smaller than the between-district estimates validates
our concern that cross-sectional estimates, even within the same state and
with a rich set of control variables, overstate the true effects.
Our main result can be displayed most transparently in a simple difference-
in-difference table (see Table 5) showing the raw mean salaries for treatment
and control districts — i.e., those that switched to on-cycle elections and
those that did not, respectively — before and after the change in the law.
The after column in Table 5 represents the average salary over the years 1999
to 2008, while the before column represents the last year of pre-treatment
salary, 1987. All values are expressed in 2008 dollars. A cross-sectional study
Table 5. Difference-in-differences.
Before After
Treatment 60,517 60,845
Control 62,516 63,433
Difference 1,999 2,588
Difference-in-differences 589
Note: Treatment denotes districts that switched to
on-cycle elections; Control those that did not. Before
denotes the last year of pre-treatment salary, 1987;
After is the average across post-treatment years, 1999
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would observe only the after column. Based on the post-treatment data
alone, one would conclude that there is a roughly $2600, or 4 percent, dif-
ferential in salaries between districts holding on-cycle versus off-cycle elec-
tions. Indeed, these figures are nearly identical to those reported in Anzia’s
(forthcoming) cross-sectional analysis, which she interprets as the effect of
election timing. However, as Table 5 also makes clear, there was already
a $2000 difference in salaries even before the change in the law, when all
districts held off-cycle elections. The timing of elections obviously cannot
account for the pre-treatment salary difference, but may explain the differ-
ence between the before and after salaries for treatment relative to control
districts. This difference-in-difference is only about $600, or just under 1 per-
cent of the average salary. These results are substantively the same as those
shown in Table 4, which account for the influence of time-varying covariates.
Aside from election timing, several of the control variables demonstrate
significant relationships with teacher salaries. Districts in counties with
higher average wages also pay higher teacher salaries, consistent with Rose
and Sengupta (2007). In addition, larger districts pay higher salaries, as in
Rose and Sonstelie (2006), as do more urban districts and those where there
is a higher proportion of families with school-age children.
Robustness: Matching and IV Estimates
As a robustness exercise, we repeat our analyses using matching methods,
which allow us to effectively restrict our comparisons to even-year and odd-
year districts with overlap in the covariate distribution. In other words, if
we were concerned that even-year and odd-year districts were so funda-
mentally different in observables that there was no common support, then
we might not put much stock in the linear extrapolations required to pro-
duce the regression estimates shown above. We produced estimates by three
different methods: nearest neighbor matching (Abadie and Imbens, forth-
coming), kernel-based matching (Becker and Ichino, 2002), and the doubly
robust estimator of Robins et al. (1995) (see Lunceford and Davidian, 2004).
For each method, we produced two estimates, shown in Table 6: model (A)
matches on all covariates from model (2) of Table 4; model (B) adds the
baseline salary. In each case, model specification (A) recovers differences
between even- and odd-year districts of roughly 2 percent.22 Adding the 1987
22 We produced the estimates in Stata using the following commands, respectively: nnmatch
(Abadie et al., 2004), pscore (Becker and Ichino, 2002), and dr (Emsley et al., 2008). Additional
details are available on request.122 Berry and Gersen
Table 6. Matching estimates.
Nearest neighbor Kernel Doubly robust
(A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B)
−0.016∗∗ −0.008 −0.029∗∗ −0.016 −0.021∗∗∗ -0.009
(0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.007) (0.006)
Note: Table 6 reports matching estimates of the eﬀect of election timing on
teacher salaries using three diﬀerent methods: nearest neighbor matching,
kernel-based matching, and doubly robust estimation. See text for details.
Speciﬁcation (A) includes all the control variables listed in model (2) of
Table 4. Speciﬁcation (B) adds baseline (1987) salary as a control.
∗∗∗p<0.01,
∗∗p<0.05,
∗p<0.1
salary reduces the estimated election timing effect by about half for each of
the matching methods. Thus, the matching estimates are in line with the
comparable regression estimates, indicating that the results are not being
driven by functional form assumptions. The matching exercise also reaffirms
that controlling for pre-treatment differences in salary substantially reduces
the strictly cross-sectional estimates. Indeed, the matching estimates that
include the baseline salary all fall short of statistical significance at conven-
tional levels.
A bigger concern than functional form is endogeneity. As explained above,
AB2605 was a reform that allowed school districts to change their election
dates from even to odd years, but it did not require them to do so. As such,
there is endogenous selection into the treatment and a natural worry is that
the districts that chose to change their election timing were otherwise prone
to reduce teacher salaries for some reason. One response is to emphasize
that our within-district analyses account for both observable and unobserv-
able time invariant differences across districts. For example, we need not
be concerned that the results above are an artifact of greater inherent fiscal
conservatism among districts that changed their election timing, because
such districts would have been expected to have lower teacher salaries even
before the change in election timing.
There may be a lingering concern, however, that unmeasured changes in
districts over time might be correlated with both election timing and teacher
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of AB2605 was to save money on election administration. Suppose that the
districts that were most motivated to save money on election administration
were also the most motivated to keep teacher salaries in check over time for
other reasons — due to changing needs to spend the funds on other expenses,
say. Then the districts that changed to even-year elections might be those
that were most likely to have held the line on teacher salaries even without
the electoral change. In this case, our estimates could be biased upward.
Given that we have just argued that the effect of election timing on teacher
salaries is small, we are not especially troubled by the prospect that those
estimates may be biased upward. If the true effects were even smaller, this
would only strengthen our argument. Nevertheless, to explore these endo-
geneity concerns, we conducted an instrumental variables (IV) analysis. Our
instrument relies on the fact that districts’ proposals to change the time of
their elections had to be approved by the county board. In several notable
cases — for example, Los Angeles and San Bernadino — district proposals
were rejected. A common reason given in rejecting districts’ attempts to
change their election dates was that the November general election ballot
was already crowded and that adding more offices would unduly burden vot-
ers. Based on this experience, our instrument is the number of elected offices
in the county as of 1987, which we obtained from the Census of Govern-
ments. Our reasoning is that counties with more elected offices in existence
prior to passage of AB 2605 would be less likely to consolidate school dis-
trict elections onto an already congested ballot. At the same time, we see no
reason why pre-treatment the number of elected offices in the county should
affect post-treatment teacher salaries, other than through its potential effect
on election timing.
Our IV results are shown in Table 7. The instrument performs well in the
first stage, yielding an F-statistic of 74 and showing, as predicted, that dis-
tricts in counties with more elected officials prior to the passage of AB 2605
were significantly less likely to change to on-cycle elections. Meanwhile, the
estimated effect of election timing in the second stage is zero, although it
is imprecisely estimated, with a 95% confidence interval that ranges from
−3% to 3%. While we cannot reject the hypothesis that election timing has
no effect on teacher salaries, we also cannot reject the hypothesis that the
IV results are equal to the OLS results (p =0 .53). That said, assuming our
exclusion restriction is valid, the IV analysis indicates that election timing
has no measurable effect on teacher salaries and that the results shown in
Tables 4–6 are biased upward due to endogeneity.124 Berry and Gersen
Table 7. Instrumental variables estimates.
First Second
stage stage
Even year election 0.0007
(0.017)
Log num. county elected officials (1987) −0.236∗∗∗
(0.028)
Log 1987 step-10 salary −0.368 0.574∗∗∗
(0.270) (0.055)
Pct pop 65 or older −0.684 0.198∗
(0.705) (0.106)
Pct Owner-occupied housing 0.097 −0.011
(0.207) (0.031)
Pct families with children −0.182 0.212∗∗∗
(0.424) (0.066)
Pct free-reduced lunch eligible 0.047 −0.015
(0.108) (0.017)
Log number of students −0.018 0.020∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.003)
Log county avg. wage 0.032 0.119∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.020)
Log popualtion per Sq Mi 0.039 0.007∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.003)
Constant 4.934∗ 3.517∗∗∗
(2.878) (0.571)
First-stage F-stat for instrument 73.65
Endogeneity test of election timing 0.43
p-value 0.51
Note: The even-year election dummy is instrumented with the log number of
county elected oﬃcials in 1987. The F-statistic is from the Angrist and Pishke
multivariate test. The endogeneity test is the diﬀerence in Sargan-Hansen
statistics. See Baum et al. (2007) for an explanation of both tests. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗p<0.01,
∗∗p<0.05,
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Policy Consequences: Test Scores
The preceding section explored the possibility that teachers exert greater
influence in school board elections held in odd years and subsequently are
able to extract better deals during negotiations with a board they helped
to select. The results were mixed, at best, and arguably our most persua-
sive analysis, the IV, showed effectively a zero effect of election timing on
teacher salaries. Another possibility — one with a more positive gloss —
might be that parents or pro-education interests more generally dominate
odd-year, low-turnout school board elections. Such interests, possibly includ-
ing unions, may be generally better informed about the performance of their
local schools. For instance, parents and teachers may have first-hand infor-
mation about school performance that allows them to better discern which
incumbent board members are worthy of reelection and which need to be
replaced.23 Changing elections to coincide with major state and federal races,
therefore, may increase participation by less knowledgeable voters, thereby
diminishing the overall quality of school governance. If this hypothesis is
correct, then odd-year districts might exhibit an edge in student test scores
due to having better governance.
To investigate these issues, we analyze standardized test results on the
state’s Academic Performance Index (API) between and within districts
in the same way that we did for teacher salaries. API scores are available
beginning in 1999. We use school-level scores and match each school to its
home district. We then assess whether schools in even-year election districts
perform differently from schools in odd-year election districts. Because the
formula used to compute the API can vary from one year to the next, the
raw scores are not directly comparable over time (CDE, 2009). Therefore, we
normalized the scores to create statewide percentile rankings across schools
for each year. We computed the normalization separately for elementary,
high school, and unified districts, so that each school is ranked with respect
to others of the same type.24
We begin by regressing API percentile scores on the election timing
indicator, which is effectively a test of the difference of means between
23 Chingos et al. (2010) ﬁnd that parents are better informed about school performance than are
other voters.
24 The CDE provides decile rankings of schools — that is, a classiﬁcation of schools into deciles
of performance on the API. We obtain similar results when we use the CDE decile rankings;
however our percentile rankings generate somewhat more precise estimates.126 Berry and Gersen
Table 8. Election timing and test scores.
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS FE
Even year election dummy 7.246∗∗∗ 1.830∗∗ −1.712
(2.661) (0.770) (1.908)
Pct free/reduced lunch students −0.479∗∗∗ −0.049
(0.023) (0.200)
School characteristics index 1.013∗∗∗ 0.307∗
(0.050) (0.159)
Pct African American −0.137∗∗∗ 0.151
(0.047) (0.337)
Log enrollment 0.987∗ 7.087
(0.504) (7.149)
Constant 46.024∗∗∗ −101.037∗∗∗ −53.297
(2.036) (11.621) (57.404)
Number of observations 31,311 27,629 630
R2 0.016 0.825 0.051
Note: The unit of analysis is the school. The dependent variable is the school’s
percentile ranking on the API. Standard errors clustered by district reported in
parentheses.
∗∗∗p<0.01,
∗∗p<0.05,
∗p<0.1.
even- and odd-year districts. The results, shown in model (1) of Table 8,
reveal that even-year districts score 7.2 percentile points higher than odd-
year districts on the API. Controlling for school-level observables, however,
substantially reduces the estimated differential. Model (2) introduces the
following independent variables: school size, the percent of students receiv-
ing free or reduced-price lunch, the percent African American, and a school
characteristics index (SCI) provided by the CDE.25 With the addition of
25 The SCI is a composite index, ranging from 100 to 200, computed by the CDE to represent the
school’s demographics. The components of the index include pupil mobility, pupil ethnicity,
pupil socioeconomic status, teacher accreditation, class size, grade span, the percentages of
gifted and disabled students, and the percentage of migrant students. For details of how the
index is constructed, see CDE (2009, pp. 66–69). We experimented with using the component
variables individually and found that they did not appreciably alter our estimates of the election
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these controls, the estimated performance gap between even- and odd-year
districts falls dramatically to 1.8 percentile points, but remains statistically
significant. Finally, model (3) introduces district fixed effects, tying identi-
fication to within-district changes in performance from the 12 districts that
changed election timing during the study period.26 The point estimates in
the final model are negative 1.7 percentile points, though nowhere near to
being statistically significant.
Overall, we see little evidence to suggest that election timing, and by
implication voter turnout, notably affects school performance. Most of the
mean difference in performance between even- and odd-year districts can
be adduced to differences in observable student characteristics. Even taking
the estimates from model (2) at face value, however,a2p ercentile point dif-
ferential is substantively quite small considering that the standard deviation
in percentile scores is 29. Our findings are broadly consistent with those of
Rose and Sonstelie (2006), who find no relationship between teacher salaries
and student test scores in California (although they do not examine election
timing).
Implications
Our empirical analysis yields three main results. First, when school board
elections are held to coincide with state and national elections, turnout is
dramatically higher, on the order of 150 percent higher. Second, our best esti-
mates indicate that there is no causal relationship between election timing
and teacher salaries. Although salaries are higher in districts where elections
are held off-cycle, the difference is small in size and not robust corrections for
endogeneity. Third, election timing is not associated with a robust change in
student achievement. From the perspective of education policy, these find-
ings are important in and of themselves.
More generally, the results also have implications for a related debate
about the relationship between voters and nonvoters in elections. Put simply,
would public policy change if voter participation increased dramatically?
Does a low voter turnout rate imply that a small subset of special interest
voters controls politics and policy? Or, are voters largely representative of
26 We cannot estimate changes relative to baseline, pre-treatment levels because test scores are
not available prior to 1999.128 Berry and Gersen
nonvoters such that neither the outcomes of elections nor resulting public
policies would change even if all eligible voters participated in politics?27
There are three dominant views in political science about the relation-
ship between voters and nonvoters. First, one strand of scholarship dat-
ing at least back to Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) argues that changes
in voter turnout would produce negligible effects on electoral outcomes.
As Highton and Wolfinger put it (1999) ‘‘voters differ minimally from all
citizens’’ (Bennett and Resnick, 1990; Gant and Lyons, 1993; Norrander,
1989). A second view is that the voting public actually has significantly dif-
ferent preferences from the nonparticipating public. For example, Leighley
and Nagler (2009) argue that moderates are under-represented in the vot-
ing population (relative to the universe of nonvoters) and conservatives
are over-represented, a gap that has increased in the past several decades.
Related scholarship attempts to link policy outcomes and rates of voting
with cross-sectional data: states with higher rates of voting among less afflu-
ent demographic groups have policies that are friendlier toward low income
populations (Hill and Leighley, 1992, 1995). A third view agrees with the
descriptive claim that voters and nonvoters are different, but raises doubts
that electoral outcomes would routinely differ even if more nonvoters were to
vote, largely because so few elections are competitive enough for the differ-
ences to matter (Citrin et al., 2003). Alternatively, even if the same officials
would be elected, it could be that those officials would be more responsive to
the views of voters than nonvoters (Griffin and Newman, 2005; Bartels, 2009;
Gilens, 2005), implying that policies might differ as a function of turnout
even if the winners of any given election would not change.
The conventional approach to these issues relies on survey data to compare
the partisanship and policy preferences of voters with those of nonvoters,
makes extrapolations as to how nonvoters would have voted (if they had
voted), and asks whether their hypothetical votes would have changed elec-
tion outcomes. While this approach is sensible and productive, it also suffers
from three notable limitations. First, it assumes that unobservable differ-
ences between voters and nonvoters — that is, differences in attributes or
attitudes not measured in the survey — do not confound the extrapolation
from survey responses to vote choice. If a voter and a nonvoter differ in
some unmeasured way, then it may not be the case a nonvoter would make
27 Andrew Gelman provides an accessible and informative introduction to these questions: http://
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the same vote choice as a voter with the identical observable characteris-
tics. Second, the approach assumes that the politics surrounding the election
would not change under the counterfactual of full turnout. But if politi-
cians expected nonvoters to turnout, other aspects of the campaign might
change accordingly. For instance, if candidates changed their platforms or
tactics to appeal to erstwhile nonvoters, then the vote choice of both groups
might change relative to the current state of the world. Finally, and in our
view most importantly, the survey-based approach can say little about how
policy would change as a result of increased turnout. That is, regardless of
whether the identity or party of the winning candidate changes, the ultimate
question scholars of politics should care most about is whether imple-
mented public policy would change if turnout increased. This latter ques-
tion cannot be answered without an additional step of extrapolation beyond
survey data.
Our analysis mitigates many of these challenges. While judging the sub-
stantive magnitude of the observed effects in our data is inevitably somewhat
subjective, they support the conventional view that outcomes would not
change importantly if everyone voted (e.g., Highton and Wolfinger, 2002;
Citrin et al., 2003). Arguably our most persuasive results come from the
IV analysis, which indicates no effect of election timing. IV results notwith-
standing, even the results that merely control for baseline salary yield esti-
mates of only about 1 percent, which is equivalent to roughly $600. While
this amount may or may not be viewed as large from the perspective of an
individual teacher, it seems fair to say that a (at most) 1% increase in salary
associated with a 150% increase in turnout is a very small elasticity. Indeed,
even if we allow for the possibility that the effects are compounded over
time, 1% observed over 10 to 20 years post-treatment is a miniscule rate of
appreciation. If turnout changes this large are necessary to drive a policy
shift this small, it casts doubt on the idea that the more modest variation
in turnout typically observed in general interest elections at the state or
national level could be expected to generate major policy changes.
On the other hand, while the salary differential is negligible, we cannot
rule out potential effects along other unstudied dimensions. For example, if
unions were also able to extract more favorable terms on tenure standards,
working conditions, or other employment parameters not readily measured
in this study, the aggregate effect on policy might be more consequential.
Moreover, we have only examined one of the dozens of types of special-
purpose local governments for which low-turnout, off-cycle elections are130 Berry and Gersen
commonplace. Berry (2009) argues that small increases in spending multi-
plied across many layers of government can produce significant aggregate
consequences for public sector budgets. Thus, if a small but significant elec-
tion timing effect were observed in all the special purpose jurisdictions in
a given locality, the aggregate effects would obviously be much larger and
more important from a policy perspective.
Aside from the magnitude of the effects, another important consideration
is their generalizability. Indeed, one concern is that the effects we observe
in California are particularly small because the state’s school finance sys-
tem leaves little room for local districts to alter the size of their budgets.
On this question, two points are relevant. First, as explained above, districts
have nearly complete latitude in setting teacher salaries and there is tremen-
dous heterogeneity in salaries across districts within California. So lack of
local discretion appears unlikely to be the primary explanation for the small
observed effects. In addition, we note that two cross-sectional studies, one
using national data (Trounstine, 2010) and one using data from 8 states
(Anzia, forthcoming), find salary differences similar in magnitude to our own
cross-sectional estimates (e.g., model (2) of Table 4). While we suspect that
the cross-sectional estimates overstate the true size of the effects, for rea-
sons elucidated above, that cross-sectional estimates from outside California
comport with our own cross-sectional estimates suggests that the California
system may not be so different as to limit the generalizability of the find-
ings. That said, of course we place our stock on the within-district estimates
rather than the cross-sectional estimates, and the only way to truly know
whether those results generalize would be to replicate the study elsewhere
using a comparable quasi-experiment of some kind. On this last point, we
note that a new analysis by Anzia (2011), using a research design reminis-
cent of our own, finds a comparable effect (about 1 percentage point) of
election timing on teacher salaries in Texas.
Conclusion
The relationship between electoral institutions and public policy is a core
concern of modern political science. The timing of local government elec-
tions has received comparatively little emphasis in the literature and yet
this type of institutional variation offers promising data for analyzing the
impact of institutions on policy. Particularly because election timing is oftenElection Timing and Public Policy 131
controlled by the very governments subject to the elections at issue, an
understanding of the effects of timing on policy outcomes is essential to
evaluating the democratic legitimacy of local elections. If local governments
could manipulate election timing to swing policy outcomes, the role of elec-
tions in facilitating accountability would obviously be called into question.
Our analysis is one of the first to speak directly to these questions. By
focusing on a special purpose election, school boards, we are able to draw
on conventional measures of education policy, including teacher salaries and
student achievement. In addition, we are able to take advantage of much
larger differences in turnout than are typically observed for national offices;
in this case turnout more than doubles between even and odd years. Finally,
in comparison to past studies based on cross-sectional comparisons, we are
able to make stronger causal inferences about the connection between elec-
toral institutions and policy. Our analysis tests whether massive changes in
voter participation are associated with changes in policy outcomes within
the same jurisdiction. Our results suggest that the effects are at best modest
and likely zero. While certainly not the final word, we hope these results con-
tribute to the accumulating literature on the effects of electoral institutions
on public policy.
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